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Guidance on Risk Analysis and Safety Implications of a Large LNG Spill Over Water - LNG Review 2005
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Sandia National Laboratories
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Originally printed in:
LNG Review
- 2005
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In the LNG industry, a customised risk management approach is necessary, because every LNG site has unique features. Performance-based safety requirements are often used in instances where there is a lack of information on operational consequences or hazards. In many cases, safety information does exist and, based on available data, prescriptive safety requirements described by codes, standards or other regulations are often developed and recommended. For combined safety and security applications, where threats can change or grow rapidly, performancebased regulations and strategies can often provide the flexibility needed to respond to the evolving security and safety needs.
To obtain the most complete picture of the potential consequences in a given breach scenario, a target–mechanism–consequence model is suggested. The target is the vulnerable element on which some mechanism acts to produce an undesired consequence. For example, a private residence (target) on a nearby shore can be ignited by radiant energy from a burning LNG spill (mechanism) that might lead to loss of property (consequence). An LNG spill might trace to a number of causes, such as structural insult or premature off-loading of LNG. This article identifies some targets, mechanisms and consequences that might be useful in developing approaches to manage risks at existing or future LNG terminal sites.
Target–Mechanism–Consequence Model
Targets are usually identified as physical objects or subsystems, but people (operators, residents, etc.) are targets as well (see Table 1).
Table 1: Targets
Failure mechanisms can be either accidental or intentional; and they can be categorised as physical, cyber and communications, as well as interpersonal (see Table 2).
Table 2: Mechanisms
Intentional mechanisms (deliberate acts) can often produce greater consequences than accidental mechanisms, because the perpetrator can maximise the effects of an attack by choosing the time and place. In fact, the perpetrator might co-ordinate several simultaneous attacks, thus compounding the consequences. Consequences can include local, cascading and delayed effects, all of which must be considered in the development of an overall risk reduction and risk management approach (see Table 3).
Table 3: Consequences
Categories:
LNG
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Gas Processing
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Plant Operations Management
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