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LNG Review - 2005


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ARTICLES

Guidance on Risk Analysis and Safety Implications of a Large LNG Spill Over Water - LNG Review 2005
Sandia National Laboratories
Originally printed in:
LNG Review - 2005

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Insider Takeover or Hijacking

A number of security measures, including armed security control aboard the ship and early interdiction and inspection of the ship prior to its entry into the US, could prevent many large breaching scenarios. This could significantly reduce hazard levels and enable spill mitigation measures available to emergency response organisations to be used effectively.

A ship hijacking should be considered credible through co-ordinated efforts by insiders or others. The threat could proceed with the breach and spill of an LNG cargo tank through the use of planted or smuggled explosives or by overriding off-loading system safety interlocks to discharge LNG intentionally onto the ship, unloading terminal equipment or the water. While a number of operational procedures have been implemented to help prevent this type of potential scenario, control and surveillance of an LNG ship must be appropriately maintained to ensure adequate time to respond to a potential hijacking event.

External Terrorist Actions

External terrorist attacks could come from a number of avenues, including attack of the LNG ship with a wide range of munitions or bulk explosives. A USS Cole-type attack is often suggested as a potential attack scenario, as well as attacks with munitions such as rocket-propelled grenades or missiles, or attacks by planes. Depending on the size of the weapon or explosive charge and the location of the attack, the potential breach and LNG spill will vary.

Common approaches to the prevention or mitigation of these events are to make structures more resistant to attacks or increase the stand-off distance between the initiation of explosives and the ship. While security zones are presently used effectively for safety considerations at most of the LNG import locations in the US, a security halo for an LNG ship would have to be much smaller and effectively maintained to develop the security zones needed to prevent some of these events. Such measures could prevent a potential attacker from coming close enough to cause severe damage to an LNG vessel. This security zone might require different escort ships and escort procedures, improved overhead and sub-surface surveillance, enhanced training or enhanced security response procedures.

Recommended Focus for Risk Prevention

The threats considered and the safety and security measures employed to address them must be based on site-specific and location-specific conditions. The level of risk prevention or mitigation required will depend on the site and its location relative to major population areas and critical infrastructures. In all cases, the risk reduction strategies identified should be considered from a cost-effectiveness viewpoint; i.e. risks should be reduced to acceptable levels in the most cost-effective manner possible for a given site and location.

To guide risk management efforts and reduce impact on operations, it is recommended to define threatscalable safety and security measures and then tie safety- and security-related operations to these levels, which is the approach taken by the US Department of Homeland Security for its threat advisory system. In this way, for each threat condition, protection and operations changes can be implemented in order to maintain an acceptable level of risk to public health and safety. Although the Department of Homeland Security defines threat levels, this might or might not be appropriate for an LNG transport system. Sandia National laboratories suggests three levels as a minimum – normal, off-normal and emergency. Unlike the Department of Homeland Security, the sole focus of which is security, this would extend this formalism to both LNG security and safety.

Generally, the safety efforts currently in place for LNG transportation over water have been very effective in preventing accidents and appear to be adequate. At some locations, however, security efforts required to prevent intentional breaching events might have to be increased in order to reduce the risks to public health and safety. Since 11 September 2001, current safety and security efforts have been increased and are continuing to evolve to meet the challenges of ever changing security threats.

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Categories: LNG ,  Gas Processing ,  Plant Operations Management

 




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